Abstract. In this paper, we study an E0-like combiner with memory as the keystream generator. First, we formulate a systematic and simple method to compute correlations of the FSM output sequences (up to certain bits). An upper bound of the correlations is given, which is useful to the designer. Second, we show how to build either a unibias-based or multi-bias-based distinguisher to distinguish the keystream produced by the combiner from a truly random sequence, once correlations are found. The data complexity of both distinguishers is carefully analyzed for performance comparison. We show that the multi-bias-based distinguisher outperforms the uni-bias-based distinguisher only when the patterns of the largest biases are linearly dependent. The keystream distinguisher is then upgraded for use in the key-recovery attack. The latter actually reduces to the well-known Maximum Likelihood Decoding (MLD) problem given the keystream long enough. We devise an algorithm based on Fast Walsh Transform (FWT) to solve the MLD problem for any linear code with dimension L and length n within time O(n + L · 2 L ). Meanwhile, we summarize a design criterion for our E0-like combiner with memory to resist the proposed attacks.
Introduction
To protect confidentiality, stream ciphers are often used in the constrained environment (e.g. high speed, minimal area, limited power supply, low power consumption). For this reason, wireless encryption often uses stream ciphers (e.g. A5/1 in GSM, E0 in Bluetooth, RC4 in WEP).
Many stream ciphers are based on Linear Feedback Shift Registers (i.e. LFSRs [41] ). They use different mechanisms such as the irregular clocking, the nonlinear combination function or the nonlinear filtering function to destroy the fatally weak property of LFSRs: linearity. We call them by clock-controlled generators, nonlinear combiners and nonlinear filter generators respectively.
As one of the mainstream attacks on LFSR-based stream ciphers, correlation attack was first introduced by Siegenthaler [50] to attack the nonlinear combiners. The basic idea is to "divide and conquer" when the keystream output is correlated to the individual LFSR output sequence due to the poor choice of the combining function. That is, instead of the naive exhaustive search on all possible combinations of the initial states of the component LFSRs, we only perform an exhaustive search for the initial state of each individual LFSR independently and test the correlation between each LFSR output sequence and the keystream. The optimum (deterministic) Maximum Likelihood Decoding (MLD) strategy yields the answer for the initial state of the LFSR. This idea can be applied to attack nonlinear filter generators (e.g. [20, 23, 47, 51] ).
Apparently, the time complexity of the basic correlation attack [50] grows exponential in the length of the LFSR, which is impractical for a long LFSR. As a matter of fact, in coding theory, the MLD problem for linear codes, according to [5] , was shown to be NP-complete (see [21] for definition). The focus of cryptographers has been on the general problem where the individual LFSR may be arbitrarily long. In order to speed up the attack for the general setting, Meier and Staffelbach [38, 39] used the probabilistic iterative decoding strategy to refine the basic correlation attack into a so-called "fast correlation attack" to reconstruct each individual LFSR. A critical factor for the efficiency of the fast correlation attack is the novel use of the multiple polynomial of the LFSR's feedback polynomial with low weight (and low degree). This fast correlation attack of [38, 39] was improved by a series of variant fast correlation attacks (e.g. [10, 13, [44] [45] [46] 55] ). Recently, various (still probabilistic) decoding techniques have proved very successful to further improve the performance of the fast correlation attack (e.g. [8, 9, 11, 12, [27] [28] [29] 42, 43] ).
As a new emerging short-range wireless radio standard with low power consumption, Bluetooth [6] uses the stream cipher E0. It is a combiner with memory and actually a variant of the summation generator [48] . In this paper, we propose an E0-like combiner with memory as the stream cipher. A systematic computation method is formulated to calculate correlations of the FSM output sequences (up to certain bits) by a recursive expression. Furthermore, we give an upper bound of the correlations, which is useful to the designer. Prior to our work, correlation properties of combiners with one-bit memory, and with m-bit memory were studied in [40] , and [22] respectively. As they considered correlations of a general form, the length of the correlation pattern is restricted to be rather small for the analysis. By comparison, as we restrict ourselves to a special class of correlations (i.e. correlations of the FSM output sequence), we are able to investigate those correlations with the sequence length of much a wider range. This is quite an important result, since the search of a correlation as large as possible constitutes one of the crucial tasks for efficient correlation attacks on LFSR-based stream ciphers.
When correlations are found, we can build either a uni-bias-based or multi-bias-based distinguisher to distinguish the keystream produced by the combiner from a truly random sequence. We apply the concept of convolution to the data complexity analysis of the multi-bias-based distinguisher that uses all the correlations. Based on the theory of [4] , we show that the multi-bias-based distinguisher outperforms the uni-biasbased distinguisher only when the patterns of the largest biases are linearly dependent.
The keystream distinguisher not only enables the keystream distinguishing attack, but also can upgrade into the key-recovery attack to reconstruct the initial states of the LFSRs. The latter actually reduces to the well-known MLD problem given the keystream long enough (or the bias large enough). By means of Fast Walsh Transform (FWT), we devise an algorithm to solve the MLD problem for any linear code with dimension L and length n within time O(n + L · 2 L ). It is the best deterministic decoding algorithm known so far. Interestingly, an FWT-based algorithm was proposed in another context to speed up other kinds of fast correlation attacks [12] .
Finally, the analysis principle is successfully applied to the core of Bluetooth encryption algorithm E0. Our key-recovery attack reconstructs the initial states of the LFSRs in time 2 39 given 2 39 consecutive keystream bits after O(2 37 ) precomputation. 1 This is the best academic key-recovery attack against the core E0 compared with all the attacks [1, 2, 14, [16] [17] [18] [19] [24] [25] [26] 30, 49] on the core E0. Considering a maximal keystream length of 2745 bits for E0 used in Bluetooth, the attack is impractical. Nonetheless, the resynchronization flaw of E0 (see [34] ) enables us to deduce non-trivial correlations of full E0 from those of the core E0; this finally leads to the fastest (and only) practical known-plaintext attack on full E0 in 2005 (see [33] ).
As part of the thesis [32] , this paper extends the results of [35] with a more general approach, and summarizes a design criterion for our E0-like combiner with memory to resist the proposed attacks. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we give the mathematical model of our E0-like combiner with memory. Then we study the correlation properties of the FSM output sequence in Sect. 3. The correlation properties enables to mount the distinguishing attack on our combiner in Sect. 4; we first build a uni-bias-based distinguisher and then a multi-bias-based distinguisher, and performance comparison between the two is also analyzed. In Sect. 5, we study the key-recovery attack based on our former distinguishing attacks; we show that the key-recovery attack reduces to the MLD problem. In Sect. 6 we investigate the MLD algorithm for a linear code. We conduct a case study on the core E0 in Sect. 7. Finally, we give conclusions in Sect. 8.
Mathematical Model
Our model of the E0-like combiner with memory is depicted in Fig. 1 . It belongs to the LFSR-based combiner (with or without memory). To briefly outline, the keystream generator consists of n maximum-length LFSRs denoted by state σ t and x t , i.e.
The FSM emits one bit
which is an inner product 2 of its current state σ t and the constant ∈ GF (2) k . Finally, the combiner generates one bit z t of keystream, which is obtained by xoring one FSM output bit ψ t together with the sum of the LFSRs outputs, that is,
where 
Proof. Noticing that λ t → λ t+1 is a permutation, by induction, we know that λ 0 → λ t is a permutation for any t. Similarly, we deduce that σ 0 → σ t is a permutation for any t.
To prove the remaining part of the lemma, as
. random variables all independent of both σ 0 and x L 1 −1 assuming that (λ 0 , σ 0 ) is random and uniformly distributed. From this statement we apply (1) consecutively for
is independent of x L 1 −1 assuming that (λ 0 , σ 0 ) is random and uniformly distributed.
Throughout this paper, we restrict ourselves to F that satisfies σ t → σ t+1 is a permutation for any x t .
Correlation Properties
Definition 2. The bias of a random Boolean variable X is defined as
The correlation between two random Boolean variables X and Y is Δ(X ⊕ Y ). Assuming that (x 0 , σ 0 ) is a uniformly distributed random vector of (n + k) bits, we know that given a, b ∈ GF (2) 
is a fixed value, which can be computed as follows. For all possible (x 0 , σ 0 ), we use (1) to compute σ 1 ; thus, we can collect all possible (σ 0 , σ 1 ) and calculate Δ(a · σ 1 ⊕ b · σ 0 ) by Definition 2. The following lemma, inspired by [26] , gives an easy way to compute the bias for iterative structures.
Lemma 3. Given a set E and Θ : E × GF (2) k → GF (2) and Λ : GF (2) ε → GF (2) k , let X and Y be two independent random variables in E and GF (2) ε respectively. As-
Proof. Let Z = Λ(Y ). By our assumption, Z is a random variable independent of X with uniform distribution. We have
for any w ∈ GF (2) k . We rewrite the right-hand side as follows:
As the inner sum over w is zero for all z = Λ(y), we continue
Now we introduce the general iterative computation method to calculate the biases. 
and the state transition matrix U = {U ab } where 
where U is the Walsh transform of U .
Proof. We apply Lemma 3 with
. Note that the assumption of Lemma 3 holds by Lemma 1, and that the connection with U comes
In order to state our result on the upper bound of the correlations for the combiner's FSM output sequence of short length, we recall a few definitions from information theory (see [15] ). The entropy H (X) of a discrete random variable X with alphabet X is defined by
The binary entropy function h(p) for 0 < p < 1 is defined by
The following results on their relationship are useful for us. For any two random variables X, Y we always have H (X) ≥ H (X|Y ) with equality if and only if X and Y are independent. Analogously, for any three random variables X, Y and Z, we always have H (X|Z) − H (X|Y, Z) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if X and Y are conditionally independent given Z. Based on information theory, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5. With the assumptions of Theorem 4, there exists a positive ρ such that
and ρ only depends on the state transition matrix U .
Proof.
We compute H (ψ 1 |σ 0 ) by definition:
So there exists such a unique ρ ≥ 0 to satisfy the equation in Lemma 5, that is,
and from (5) we know that ρ depends on U only. 
. , ψ ε−1 ). With the assumptions of Theorem 4, we have
where ρ is defined in (5).
Proof. First, by the property of the relation between the entropy and the conditional entropy, we deduce that
According to the property of the conditional entropy, we have
with equality if and only if ψ ε−1 and (σ ε−3 , . . . , σ 0 ) are conditionally independent given σ ε−2 , which is valid here by the precondition ε ≤ L 1 + 1 and Lemma 1. Thus, we have
Combining (6) and (7), we get
with the maximum at p = 1 2 , this is equivalent to
Finally, we verify
Putting (8) and (9) together we complete our proof.
Remark 7.
This theorem tells that the basic FSM design principle should satisfy H (ψ 1 |σ 0 ) = 1 to avoid the bias, which enables the keystream distinguishing attack and key-recovery attack as detailed in the rest of the paper.
Notice that the only purpose of the restriction on the dimension of α (i.e. ε ≤ L 1 + 1), is to ensure validity of U being the state transition matrix. In other words, if we loose this requirement by supposing U is always the state transition matrix, 3 we still obtain the same upper bound ρ for |Δ(α · )|. Though it is not known yet which tuple(s) α makes |Δ(α · )| the maximum from Theorem 6, one thing is certain: 4 once H (ψ 1 |σ 0 ) = 1, no correlation exists for sequences of bitlength up to L 1 + 1.
Prior to our work, correlation properties of combiners with one-bit memory, and with m-bit memory were studied in [40] , and [22] respectively. As they considered correlations of a general form (i.e. correlation between any linear function of the sequence {ξ t } of ε bits and any linear function of the keystream {z t } of ε bits), ε is restricted to be rather small for the analysis. In our work, we restrict ourselves to a special class of correlations-correlations of the FSM output sequence (i.e. correlations of any linear function of the sequence {ξ t ⊕ z t } of ε bits). This allows to investigate those correlations for the sequence length ε ≤ L 1 + 1 with much a wider range. 5 
The Keystream Distinguisher

The Equivalent Single LFSR
Let θ i be the order of the characteristic polynomial
Since all p i (x) are primitive polynomials, θ i = 2 L i − 1; furthermore, by Lemma 6.57 of [31, p. 218] , the equivalent LFSR which generates the same sequence {ξ t } as the sum of the n original LFSR outputs over GF (2) has the characteristic polynomial
Finding the Multiple Polynomial with Low Weight
Let L be the degree of a general polynomial p(x) with order θ . We use the standard approximation 6 to estimate the minimal weight w d of multiples of p(x) with degree at most d by the following constraint: w d is the smallest w such that
Listed in Table 1 is the estimated 7 w d corresponding to d with L = 128 by solving inequality (10) . To find multiples with minimum weight, Canteaut and Chabaud [7] proposed an efficient algorithm for a not too large degree d (e.g. less than 2 11 ). Here, we are interested in the case with very large d 2 11 . So we can use the conventional birthday paradox to find Q(x) with the minimal d (i.e. w = w d ), which takes precomputation
); alternatively, we can use the generalized birthday problem to find Q(x) of same weight but higher degree with much less precomputation as tradeoff (see [53] for detail). Table 2 compares the two algorithms. Note that unless otherwise mentioned explicitly in the notations, throughout the paper, we always use log(·) to represent the natural logarithm to the base of e, which is omitted from the notations. 6 Note that this approximation of (10) is valid for typical settings in cryptography. However, it may not hold for some special cases (e.g. some of the products of two primitive polynomials with the same degree do not have any multiple polynomial of weight 3). 7 One special case occurs for d = θ because we know the exact value of w d .
Building a Uni-Bias-Based Distinguisher
all t 0 , by (3), we deduce that
With the heuristic assumption of independence, we know from the famous Piling-up lemma [37] that the right-hand side of (11) has a bias |γ | w (resp. −|γ | w ) if γ is positive (resp. negative). With standard linear cryptanalysis techniques, we can therefore distinguish the keystream {z t } from a truly random sequence with a number of samples within the order of magnitude of ζ = γ −2·w , simply by checking the left-hand side of (11) equals zero (resp. one) most of the time with the positive (resp. negative) γ . Based on Q(x) with d and w, we minimize the data complexity Ξ by choosing
The Multi-Bias-Based Distinguisher
Preliminaries
, where 1 denotes a constant function equal to 1.
Note that the first two definitions correspond to convolution and Walsh transform respectively. We recall these basic facts: for any f, g : GF (2) → R, we have
where Δ(A) is defined in Definition 2, Sect. 3.
An Efficient Way to Deploy Multi-Biases Simultaneously
We are interested in the possibility of further improving the performance of the distinguisher by using more than one bias simultaneously. To address this problem, we introduce a linear mapping 
for any b ∈ GF (2) . Moreover, the Walsh transforms of D A and D are also linked by
for all b ∈ GF (2) . Now we discuss how to design J in order to reduce the data complexity. From Baignères et al. [4] , we know that we can distinguish a distribution f of -bit random vectors from a uniform distribution with 1/Δ 2 (f ) samples. Here, the distribution of B t is f = D ⊗w A . So the modified distinguisher needs data complexity
Let μ be the number of nonzero b such that the Walsh coefficient D A (b) has the largest absolute value 8 (denoted by η).
In order to lower Ξ , it is necessary to have < μ. This implies that only when the patterns of the μ largest coefficients are linearly dependent, the multi-bias distinguisher is more efficient than the uni-bias distinguisher; otherwise, the former is as efficient as the latter. Note that Sect. 4.3 actually deals with the special type of distinguishers with = μ = 1.
The Key-Recovery Attack
We use the same approach as in [16] 
Two cases of statistical characteristics arise. We use similar analysis [52] for the case γ > 0, which can be easily adjusted for γ < 0.
Case One:x 1 = x 1 . We have
Recall from Sect. 4.3, we know that p Case Two:x 1 = x 1 . We have
for any fixed keystream {z t }. We immediately have
w is fixed in the attack, so we omit it in the notation N(x 1 ).
for any fixed keystream {z t }. We deduce that the average of N(x 1 ) over allx 1 = x 1 is
So N(x 1 ) asymptotically complies with the binomial distribution B(ζ ; Since we are interested in the probability of success to distinguish the two distinct distributions, we compute the probability of error Pr err as . We have
where is the standard normal distribution. Thus we estimate the rank of N(x 1 ) among all N(x 1 ) in ascending order by
According to the conventional estimation [11, 27] in correlation attacks, derived by channel coding theory, the critical data complexity ζ 0 , on the order of γ −2w , is ζ 0 =
γ 2w , and h is the binary entropy function. Note that this critical data complexity ζ 0 does not guarantee that N(x 1 ) is the smallest (resp. largest) of all N(x 1 ) with positive (resp. negative) γ . According to [11] simulations showed the probability of success is closer to 1 2 for ζ = ζ 0 . Here, we are interested with a minimum ζ such that the probability of success is closer to 1. Hence, we set ζ = k 0 γ −2w for some k 0 to be determined by solving E[Rank N(x 1 ) ] = 1 in (13). Finally, we obtain that the minimum
is needed to guarantee that N(x 1 ) is the smallest (resp. largest) of all N(x 1 ) with positive (resp. negative) γ . Note that our analysis is consistent with simulation results in [11] , which showed that the probability of success is close to 1 for ζ = 2ζ 0 . Clearly, our problem of recovering R 1 right fits into the Maximum Likelihood Decoding (MLD) problem for a general linear code, as described in Sect. 6. Thus, solving MLD problem allows to recover r, after which we apply linear transform to solve x 1 .
A Maximum Likelihood Decoding Algorithm
We first recall the following basics of linear codes (see [36] for details). Given a matrix G L×κ (with L < κ), for every message r = (r 1 , . . . , r L ), define the codeword
The set of all codewords form the linear code, defined by G. The code is said to have dimension L, length κ and generator matrix G. The MLD problem for the linear code is: find the message r which minimizes the Hamming distance 10 between the associated codeword x and the received vector s = (s 1 , . . . , s κ ) , i.e. find such r that minimizes N(r) = κ t=1 (s t ⊕ x t ), where x t = rG t (G t denotes the t-th column vector of G).
For example, our preceding key-recovery attack in Sect. 5 can be transformed into the MLD problem as follows. Define the column vector G t of the generator matrix G by G t = (a 0 , . . . , a L 1 −1 ) , where a 0 + a 1 
And let L = L 1 , κ = ζ , r = r, x = {r t } and s = {s t }.
The Time-Domain Analysis
The trivial solution to find r is an exhaustive search in the time-domain: for every messager, we compute N(r) and keep the smallest. The final record leads to r. The time complexity is O(κ · 2 L ) with memory κ bits.
The Frequency-Domain Analysis
We introduce an integer-valued function,
for all x ∈ GF (2) L , where denotes the matrix transpose. We compute the Walsh transform W of W as follows:
We thereby reach the theorem below. 10 The Hamming distance between two vectors x = (x 1 , . . . , x ) and y = (y 1 , . . . , y ) of equal dimension is the number of coordinates where they differ.
Algorithm 1 The frequency transformation algorithm
Inputs: Time Memory
Theorem 9.
This generalizes the result [36, p. 414] of a special case when κ = 2 L and G t corresponds to the binary representation of t. So, to solve the MLD problem, we just compute W, perform FWT (see [54] where k = log 2 κ ). Note that when κ ≥ 2 L , the time complexity corresponds to O(κ), which is optimal in the sense that it stands on the same order of magnitude as the data complexity does. Table 3 compares the original exhaustive search algorithm with the improved frequency transformation algorithm. Note that the technique of FWT was used in another context [12] to speed up other kinds of fast correlation attacks. In the case of the core E0 (see Sect. 7), we will see how it helps to speed up the attack [16] by a factor of 2 24 . We estimate similar correlation attacks like [11] can be speeded up by a factor of 10; undoubtedly, some other attacks can be significantly improved by our FWT-based algorithm as well.
A More Generalized MLD Algorithm
We further generalize the preceding problem by finding the L-bit vector r such that given a sequence of -bit ( < L) vectors S 1 , . . . , S τ and f : GF (2) → R together with matrices G 1 , . . . , G τ of size L by , the sequence of -bit vectors X 1 , . . . , X τ defined by X t = rG t minimizes N(r) = τ t=1 f (S t ⊕ X t ). It means the linear code has length τ , dimension L, and the generator matrix G = (G 1 , . . . , G τ ) . Note that our previous problem in Sect. 6.2 is merely a special case of = 1, τ = κ and f (a) = a for a ∈ GF (2) .
Define a real function
for all x ∈ GF (2) L . We compute the Walsh transform W of W as follows:
= N(r). 
Algorithm 2 directly follows above computation. The total running time of our algorithm is O(τ L2 + L2 L ) with memory O(2 L ).
Note that above special case is applicable to the core E0 (see Sect. 7).
Comments
According to [5] , the general decoding problem for linear codes is shown to be NPcomplete (see [21] for definition) in the sense that the known deterministic algorithm that decodes an arbitrary linear code with dimension L and length κ performs an exhaustive trial on all possible codewords. Thus, prior to us, the best deterministic decoding algorithm takes time O(2 L × κ). In our work, we showed that the decoding time O(L · 2 L + κ) is achievable and it grows linear in κ. This makes it possible now to decode the linear code with not so large dimension but very large length in which case the naive exhaustive decoding is infeasible.
Case Study: the Core of Bluetooth E0
Description
Specified in [6], the core keystream generator E0 (Fig. 2) used in Bluetooth fits in the model in Sect. 01  02  03  10  11  12  13  20  21  22  23  30  31  32  33   0  00  11  23  32  03  12  20  31  01  10  22  33  02  13  21  30  1  00  10  23  31  03  13  20  32  01  11  22  30  02  12  21  33  2  01  10  20  31  02  13  23  32  00  11  21  30  03  12  22  33  3  01  13  20  30  02  10  23  33  00  12  21  31  03  11  22  32  4  02  13  21  30  01  10  22  33  03  12  20  31  00  11  23  32 respectively. The state σ t of the FSM contains (c t−1 , c t ) of k bits, where k = 4 and
x i t be the Hamming weight 11 of x t . The FSM has the update function F : (w(x t ), c t−1 , c t ) → (c t , c t+1 ) . Computing c t+1 from σ t can be described by
where the 2-bit Table 4 shows the state transition of the FSM, where the four-bit state is represented in the quaternary system (e.g. the FSM changes from σ t = 13 into σ t+1 = 32 by the input w(x t ) = 2). One can check Table 4 by above equations. With = 01 in (2), at each clock cycle t, the FSM emits one bit ψ t = c 0 t . The keystream output bit is
Correlations
From Sect. 3, we know that if (λ 0 , σ 0 ) is uniformly distributed, then, for ε ≤ 26 and
is a constant and does not depend on t. It can be computed by Theorem 4. However, notice that the core E0 has such a special FSM that the two consecutive states σ t and σ t+1 are half overlapped (i.e. 2-bit c t is contained in both). Therefore, to compute the value of
, the sequence α 1 , . . . , α ε is not unique. So, we resort to another notation Ω for the unique expression of the same thing instead. v = (a 1 , . . . , a ε−1 ) and obtain the following result. Assuming (λ 0 , σ 0 ) is uniformly distributed, for any ε ≤ 27 and
Here is a full list of nonzero triplets:
With the list, we computed all ε-tuple biases for ε ≤ 27 and found out that the largest two biases are Ω (1, 1, 1, 1, 1 . Both biased were mentioned in [17, 24] without formal proof. Below we give formal proof on the two biases.
Property 10. Assuming (λ t , σ t ) is random and uniformly distributed, we have
Proof. We show the equivalent Ω(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) = − 25 256 as follows:
Remark 11. Assuming w(x t ) = 2 holds for t = t 0 , t 0 + 1, t 0 + 2, then, regardless of the value of σ t 0 , we always have
Since Pr(w(x t ) = 2) = which explains the bias in Property 10. This special case was not pointed out in [17, 24] however.
Property 12. Assuming (λ t , σ t ) is random and uniformly distributed, we have
Pr ( Besides the above two largest biases, we have the only second largest bias up to 27 bits Ω(1, 0, 1, 1) = −2 −4 . This bias was already proved in [26] . Now, we apply Theorem 6 in Sect. 3 to compute the theoretical upper bound of Ω(a) for any a of at most 27 tuples and compare γ with it. To show this, we first list the state transition matrix U (where dashed entries denote zeros) as follows: 
From U , we notice that | b: ·b=1 U ab − b: ·b=0 U ab | remains a constant ρ 0 = 4 16 = 2 −2 for all a. Hence ρ = ρ 0 = 2 −2 . Consequently, applying Theorem 6, we know
for any a of at most 27 tuples. We check that γ ≈ 2 −3.36 < 2 −2 .
Keystream Distinguishers
We are ready to build a distinguisher for the core E0 upon above largest correlations together with the multiple Q(x) of 65 respectively. Note that we may also expect optimal multiples with degree on the same order of magnitude and weight 3 from Table 1 . Table 5 summarizes the best performance of our primary (unibias-based) distinguisher for the core E0 based on either the use of Q 3 (x) with weight 4, or a search of Q(x), when we choose α = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) or (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1).
Primary Distinguisher
Advanced Distinguisher From Sect. 4.4, we know that the multi-bias-based distinguisher improves the uni-bias-based one only when the patterns of the largest correlation coefficients are linearly dependent, which happens to be true in the core E0: recall from Property 10 and Property 12 that the 6-tuple patterns of the three largest biases satisfy the linear relation, As a simple solution we may just pick ν = 6, = 2, J 1 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0) and J 2 = (0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (where J i is the i-th row of J ), then we obtain μ = 3. And the data complexity Ξ is reduced to a factor of 2 3 for negligible d. Indeed, recall that we proved by computation that the largest Walsh coefficient for ν ≤ 27 are either (0, . . . , 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) or (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0 , 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0
then we obtain μ = 2 − 1. And so the improved factor 2 −1 of data complexity Ξ tends to 1 2 for negligible d when goes to infinity; however, because of the underlying assumption for the core E0, ν is restricted to no larger than 27, i.e. ≤ 23. To conclude, we show that the modified distinguisher (Algorithm 3) needs data complexity Table 6 shows the best improvement achieved with = 23. We see that the minimum Ξ drops from previous 2 34 to 2 33 . Table 7 lists the corresponding triplets (w, d, P C) for small w. As detailed in Sect. 5, we use the MLD algorithm in Sect. 6.2 to recover x 1 . Table 8 shows our estimated minimal ζ corresponding to w by (14) . Moreover, we conduct the same analysis as in Sect. 7.3 to decrease ζ by a factor of 2 −1 for 1 ≤ ≤ 23; and we apply the technique introduced in Sect. 6.3 to obtain the time
The attack complexities to recover R 1 for the core E0 are listed in Table 9 for two best cases denoted by A and B, where we choose = 12.
Once we recover R 1 , we target R 2 next based on multiple of p 3 (x)p 4 (x). Last, we use the technique of guess and determine in [19] to solve R 3 and R 4 with knowledge of the shortest two LFSRs. The detailed complexities of each step are shown in Table 10 . A comparison of our attacks with the similar attack 12 [16] and the best attacks [14, 25] (both were algebraic attacks) is shown in Table 11 for Case A and B.
Experimental Results with w = 1 We did the small-scale experiment to verify our analysis in Sect. 5 on the keystream { (12) for definition) for a total of 100 randomly chosen initial states of the core E0. From (13), we have E[Rank N(x 1 ) ] = 1 for ζ = 2 14 . It turned out that N(x 1 ) ranks uniquely the top without exception. Second, we choose some random x 1 , then compute the corresponding average and variance of for 2 25 random initial states of the core E0. And we got the average of around 0.5488 with variance 2.121 × 10 −5 (in contrast to the estimation of average 281 512 ≈ 0.5488, variance 2 −16 ≈ 1.526 × 10 −5 respectively). Its experimental probability distribution is drawn on the right curve of Fig. 3 . It is worth noticing that the two curves are indeed distinct.
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose an E0-like combiner with memory as a keystream generator. We formulate a systematic computation method to calculate correlations of the FSM output sequences (up to certain bits) by a recursive expression. In addition, we give a upper bound of the correlations, which is useful to the designer. When correlations are found, we can build either a uni-bias-based or multi-bias-based distinguisher to distinguish the keystream produced by the combiner from a truly random sequence. We apply the concept of convolution to the analysis of the multi-bias-based distinguisher that uses all correlations. Based on the theory of [4] , it is shown that the multi-bias-based distinguisher outperforms the uni-bias-based distinguisher only when the largest biases are linearly dependent. The keystream distinguisher not only enables the keystream distinguishing attack, but also can upgrade into the key-recovery attack to reconstruct the initial states of the LFSRs. The latter actually reduces to the well-known MLD problem given the keystream long enough (or the bias large enough). By means of FWT, we devise an MLD algorithm to recover the closest codeword for any linear code. It is the best deterministic decoding algorithm known so far. The analysis principle is successfully applied to the core of Bluetooth encryption algorithm E0 completely. Our key-recovery attack reconstructs the initial states of the LFSRs in 2 39 time given 2 39 consecutive keystream bits after O(2 37 ) precomputation. This is the best academic key-recovery attack against the core E0 compared with all the attacks [1, 2, 14, [16] [17] [18] [19] [24] [25] [26] 30, 49] on the core E0. Considering a maximal keystream length of 2745 bits for E0 used in Bluetooth, the attack is impractical. Meanwhile, our proposed MLD algorithm can be easily adapted to speed up a class of fast correlation attacks.
All in all, an ideal nonlinear combiner with memory should satisfy one necessary design principle: the FSM must generate no biased output sequence, i.e.
H (ψ 1 |σ 0 ) = 1.
